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The instant decision is little more than a return to the pre-Schneider philosophy of second-class citizenship.55 With an appropriate congressional response, the visit may hopefully be short-lived.
MORGAN STEVENSON BRAGG

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: STATE AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT REVISITED

-

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act1
provided for the "purchase" of certain secular educational services from
nonpublic schools. The statute authorized the Pennsylvania Superintendent
of Public Instruction to reimburse eligible schools for teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials.2 Reimbursement was prohibited for
any course that contained subject matter expressing religious teaching or the
morals or forms of worship of any sect. 3 Appellant brought suit challenging
the constitutionality of the statute. A federal district court granted appellee
state officials' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
of relief.4 On appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD,
the Pennsylvania statute was in conflict with the excessive entanglement
doctrine and, therefore, violated the first amendment.,
In a companion case the 1969 Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act6
authorized state officials to pay a salary supplement directly to teachers of
secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools.7 Appellees brought suit
55. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S.
491 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).

1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§5601-09 (1968).
2. Id. §5604. An eligible school was required to keep a record of secular education costs,
as opposed to religious instructional expenses, in its accounting procedures. The school's
accounts were subject to state audit. Id. §5607. Also, payment for secular services was restricted to the following courses offered in the public school system: mathematics, modern
foreign languages, physical science, and physical education. Id. §5604.
3. Id. §5603 (3).
4. 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
6. R.I. GEN. LAws §§16-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).
7. Id. The salary supplement could not exceed 15% of an eligible teacher's salary nor,
as supplemented, could the recipient's salary be greater than the maximum salary of public
school teachers. Eligible teachers were required to agree not to teach courses in religion and
to teach only certain subjects offered in the public school system. The materials used must
be those used in public schools. In addition, the eligible teacher must have been teaching
in a nonpublic school where the average per pupil expenditure on secular instruction was
less than the average state expenditure. The Act required eligible schools to submit financial
data to the state Commissioner of Education in order to distinguish secular education costs
from religious instruction expenditures.
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seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the statute
violated the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.
A three-judge federal court ruled the Act violated the establishment clause.8
The United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, the statute fostered
excessive entanglement between government and religion and thus violated
the first amendment. 9
Historically, the establishment clause was envisioned by Thomas Jefferson as an impregnable "wall of separation between Church and State."'While the Supreme Court initially defined the scope of the establishment
clause by alluding to Jefferson's wall, 1 it later retreated from this theory.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters 2 parochial schools were permitted to operate
educational systems that competed with public schools. The principle issue
in the Supreme Court's consideration of the establishment clause, the "child
benefit" theory, was first implemented in Cochran v. Board of Education."
There, the Court upheld a statute authorizing the use of public funds to
buy textbooks for public and nonpublic school pupils. The Court reasoned
that the primary benefit accrued to the school children and their parents
and not to the school; the law was therefore constitutional under the equal
protection clause. 14 Subsequently, in Everson v. Board of Education'5 the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether state aid to parochial schools was in violation of the establishment clause.16 New York tax
revenue was provided to pay for bus fares of students, including those who
attended nonpublic schools. The Court again implemented the child benefit
theory in ruling the public welfare legislation constitutional. Since Everson
there has been a trend toward a workable compromise between the extremes
of a "wall of separation" and direct state aid to religion.- The underlying
rationale of these decisions has been the child benefit theory, which allows

8. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).

9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). A historical review of
parochial school systems is found in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in the instant
decision, 403 U.S. at 625. The historical development of the establishment clause is discussed in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948), and in Justice Black's opinion in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a separatist interpretation of the first
amendment compare L. PraF.uR, CHURCH, STATE, AND FRmvom (rev. ed. 1967), with McCloskey, Principles,Powers and Values: The Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court,
in RELIGION AND THE PUBuc ORDER (1964). See also Comment, First Amendment Religion
Clause: HistoricalMetamorphosis, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 760 (1966).

11. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
12. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
13. 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The child benefit theory actually originated in a Louisiana
supreme court decision in Borden v. Board of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1928).
14. Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. at 375.
15. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. The first amendment was made applicable to the states in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
17. Note, Constitutional Law -Aid to ParochialSchools and the Establishment ClauseEverson to Allen: From Buses to Books and Beyond, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 785, 791-92 (1969).
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a state to subsidize religious institutions as long as the primary benefit goes
to the student and not to the school.' 8
First amendment constitutionality is dependent upon satisfaction of certain criteria set forth in the instant decision. 19 First, a statute must have a
secular legislative purpose;20 second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 2' and finally, the statute
22
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
The first two criteria are a restatement of the "primary purpose and
effect" test devised in Abington School District v. ScheMpp 23 and reapplied
in Board of Education v. A llen.24 In Schempp a Pennsylvania statute required

Bible readings in public schools at the opening of each day. Any child could
be excused from the readings upon written request of his parents. The Court
ruled the statute unconstitutional, concluding that the strictures of the
establishment clause require legislative neutrality toward religion.2 In A len
the Court considered a New York law requiring school boards to lend textbooks to nonpublic school students attending schools that complied with
compulsory attendance laws.26 Although the collateral benefits would accrue
to parochial schools, the statute was held constitutional because the primary
benefit went to the student. 27 The Court recognized that parochial schools have
a dual purpose, religious instruction and secular education. 2 Thus, the child
benefit theory was used to establish a permissible primary effect; that is, one
that maintains constitutionally required neutrality toward religion.
The statutes in the instant decision were carefully drafted in light of
Allen and its predecessors to ensure aid only to secular education.29 Both
legislatures were concerned with satisfying the "primary purpose and effect"
test. The Rhode Island statute required that teachers applying for a salary

18. Id. at 791-98.
19. 403 U.S. at 612.
20. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
21. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
22. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
23. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). "The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then
the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be
a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Id. at 222. The same underlying rationale was also used in two earlier cases. See
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) and Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1 (1947).
24. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
25. 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
26. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
27. Id. at 244.
28. Id. at 245.
29. The Court noted that the legislatures of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania intended
to advance only a secular purpose. "There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant
anything else." 403 U.S. at 613.
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supplement teach only courses offered in public schools, agree not to teach
courses in religion, and use only materials used in public schools. 80 The
Pennsylvania statute limited reimbursement to courses offered in public
school curricula. 31 Additionally, both statutes subjected parochial school accounts to state audit in order to distinguish secular education costs from
religious instructional expenses.3 2
Because the statutes in the instant case dearly stated an intention to
enhance secular education, appropriate deference was given the lawmakers
and the secular legislative purpose test was ruled satisfied. 3 However, the
issue of permissible primary effect was never determined because the statutes
did not fulfill the third requirement, the excessive entanglement test.The excessive entanglement doctrine originated in Walz v. Tax Commission,35 which upheld state tax exemptions for real property owned by religions organizations and used for religious worship. The Court found that
granting tax exemptions to churches created involvements between church
and state; but the test was held to be one of degree.3 6 It concluded that there
was not an unconstitutional degree of involvement in assessing such exemptions,3 7 although an attempt to tax churches would create a high degree of
entanglement between church and state.8s
A determination of excessive government entanglement with religion
requires an examination of the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the state provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and religious authority. 9 The
instant Court concluded that the purpose of the parochial school is to
proselytize future generations to the Catholic faitho40 making the schools
substantially religious in character. 41 The nature of salary supplements for

30. RI. Gz.

LAws

§§16-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).

31.

PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 24,

32.

PA. STAT. ANN.

§5603-4 (1968).
tit. 24, §5607 (1968);

R.I. GEN. LAws

§§16-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970).

33. 403 U.S. at 613.
34. Id. at 613-14.

35. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
36. Id. at 674.
37. Id. at 675.
38. Id.

39. 403 U.S. at 615.
40. Id. at 609. The three-judge federal court found that approximately 25% of Rhode
Island's elementary students were enrolled in nonpublic schools, 95% of which were sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 608. In Pennsylvania more that 20% of the
state's school children attended nonpublic schools, most of them Catholic. Id. at 610. See
also U.S. NEws AND WORLD RzE., July 12, 1971, at 27; Wall Street J., June 29, 1971, at 1,
col. 6.
41. 403 US. at 616. "In the parochial schools Roman Catholic indoctrination is included in every subject. History, literature, geography, civics, and science are given a Roman
Catholic slant. The whole education of the child is filled with propaganda. That, of course,
is the very purpose of such schools, the very reason for going to all of the work and expense of maintaining a dual school system. Their purpose is not so much to educate, but
to indoctrinate and train, not to teach Scripture truths and Americanism, but to make
loyal Roman Catholics. The children are regimented, and are told what to wear, what to
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teachers was distinguished by the Court from subsidies found constitutional
in previous decisions.42 A conflict of functions was said to exist between the
subjective religious convictions of a parochial school teacher and the purely
secular aspects of the teaching process.43 In analyzing the Rhode Island
statute, the Court noted that a parochial school teacher is employed by a
religious organization, subject to the direction and discipline of religious
authorities, and labors in a system dedicated to rearing children in a particular faith.It is the potential for impermissible fostering of religion and not actual
religious inculcation that invalidated the principal statutes. 45 This factor
is enhanced by the impressionable age of the students, especially those in
elementary schools.4" In order to counteract this potential, both Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania drafted statutes requiring a comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance of eligible schools. 47 Such a
relationship, however, is the epitome of the forbidden entanglement of government with religion. 4 Ironically, the legislative concern for fulfilling the
permissible primary effect test resulted in the failure to comply with the exces49
sive entanglement requirement.
The potential political involvement inherent in the Rhode Island and
do, and what to think." Id. at 635 n.20.
42. 403 U.S. at 616-17. Bus transportation, school lunches, health services, and textbook
lending had been ruled constitutional under the establishment clause. The Court, especially
concerned about the dissenting opinions in Allen, noted that the ideological character of a
teacher is substantially different from that of books. "In terms of potential for involving
some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content is ascertainable, but
a teacher's handling of the subject is not." Id. at 617. This distinction allays the fears expressed by Justice Black dissenting in Allen where he hypothesizes that the Allen rationale
could be used to uphold laws providing state or federal funds to pay the salaries of religious school teachers. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 253 (1968).
43. 403 U.S. at 618-19.
44. Id. at 618.
45. Id. at 619.
46. Id. at 617. The Court has distinguished the religious aspects of church related elementary and secondary schools from religion-sponsored institutions of higher learning on
the grounds that "college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 682 (1971). This distinction appeared
to be a major factor in the Court's ruling that federal construction grants for college and
university nonreligious facilities were constitutionally valid under the establishment clause.
47. "[T]he very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that teachers play a
strictly nonideological role give rise to entanglements between church and state." 403 U.S.
at 620-21. The Court has contrasted the direct and continuing surveillance required to
ensure teacher neutrality in the instant case to one-time, single-purpose construction grants.
See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
48. 403 U.S. at 620-21.
49. Justice White expressed concern that the Court had created an insoluble paradox
for the state and parochial school by its decision in the instant case. "The State cannot
finance secular instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same classroom; but
if it exacts a promise that religion not be so taught -a promise the school and its teachers
are quite willing and on this record able to give -and enforces it, it is then entangled in
the 'no entanglement' aspect of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 403 U.S.
at 668 (concurring opinion).
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Pennsylvania laws was viewed as an additional church-state entanglement. 0
Lobbying by religious groups for legislation aimed at bolstering the financial
resources of parochial schools fosters political divisiveness. 5 This detrimental
factor is emphasized when annual appropriations may be required for the
52
benefit of relatively few religious groups.
The long and controversial history of the establishment and free exercise clauses suggests that the issue of state aid to parochial schools is far
from resolved. It is questionable -whether the three tests enunciated by the
Supreme Court offer a more explicit statement of first amendment requirements than previously existed. 53 There are two basic reasons: first, the
cumulative criteria are hardly innovative; second, these tests may have created
a paradoxical constitutional requirement.- Statutes attempting to provide a
primarily secular effect may at the same time create excessive government
entanglement with the church. Conversely, laws drafted to avoid an unconstitutional degree of state involvement with religion may effectuate a
primary religious purpose.
Perhaps this paradoxical situation was created by the type of aid provided
in the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes. Teacher salary supplements
connote "direct" aid to religion in the historical direct-indirect dichotomy.55
The Court persuasively rationalized that the nature of the teacher's position
and the government control necessary to ensure neutrality resulted in an
unconstitutional degree of church-state involvement. The instant decision
obviously jeopardizes any kind of state aid involving subsidies to parochial
school teachers. However, any aid requiring less government surveillanceconstruction grants and student tuition subsidies, for instance-may be constitutionally distinguishable from salary supplements. 5
Statutes that use public funds to supplement nonpublic school teachers'
salaries have been passed in four states, 57 and laws substantially similar to

50. Id. at 622.
51. Id. at 623-24.
52. Id. at 623.
53. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra. However, the adoption of an absolutist
position, which holds that all government contact with religion is forbidden by the
first amendment, is an unrealistic one. See Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark -A Discussion
of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. R-v. 167

(1963). "Judicial extremism in the pursuit of a workable constitutional principal is no
virtue where it causes grave societal disorder, unless a more essential overriding interest is
upheld." Note, ConstitutionalLaw - First Amendment - State Aid to Sectarian EducationChild Benefit Theory- Board of Education v. Allen, 17 CATH. U.L. Rtv. 242, 246 (1967).
54. See note 49 supra.

55. The traditional test of constitutionality for state aid to nonpublic schools has been
whether the aid is direct or indirect. See Comment, The First Amendment and Financial
Aid to Religions: Limits on the Government's Conduct, 61 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 777, 778 (1966).

In the instant case the Pennsylvania statute had the further defect of providing the
financial aid directly to the nonpublic school. 403 U.S. at 621.
56.

See note 47 supra.

57. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§10-281a to -281v (1969); LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§17:1321-35
(1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§18A:58-38 to -58 (1971); OHio Ruv. CODE ANN. §3317.06 (1970).
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the Pennsylvania "purchase of services" statute are under active consideration
in the legislatures of seven others. 58 Other states have adopted laws involving
a parental grant plan.5 9 The validity of such statutes is in question as a
result of the instant decision.
The invalidation of parochial aid statutes may result in a serious social
and economic impact on nonpublic schools. In recent years parochial schools
have faced a severe financial crisis.60 Several states have passed public welfare legislation to funnel tax revenue to religious educational systems. 6' The
instant decision may reduce the flow of these funds, forcing many parochial
schools to close their doors. Others will certainly raise tuition. This may
result in an influx of students in the public school system and, consequently,
62
an increase in state taxes to cope with the cost of expanded programs.
The Supreme Court has continually recognized the difficulty of perceiving
exactly where the "verge" of the precipice of unconstitutionality lies. Thus,
a basic theme has emerged from adjudication of establishment clause issues:
the Court is dedicated to the proposition that such issues will be resolved on
a case-by-case basis. Jefferson's wall has been battered and torn in the past
but in the present decision it was reconstructed, if only for a while.
CHARLEs Guy BATSEL

58. Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Washington, and West Virginia.
Wall Street J., June 29, 1971, at 22, col. 4. See also CHURCH AND STATE, June 1971, at 13.
59. See Wall Street J., June 29, 1971, at 22, cols. 3-4. This plan involves a "voucher"
system whereby parents of pupils who attend both public and nonpublic schools are given
a tuition grant to be applied to costs at whichever school a child attends. Its advocates
believe such a plan will pass constitutional muster because the primary benefit goes to the
child and it involves little government involvement with religion. Id.
60. See U.S. NEWs AND WORLD REP., July 12, 1971, at 27. In 1967 there were 12,627
Catholic elementary and high schools in the United States. These schools comprised 85%
of the total number of nonpublic schools. By 1970 this number had decreased to 11,352 as
a result of increased costs, which have driven tuition up beyond the means of many parents.
Id. See also Wall Street J., June 29, 1971, at I, col. 6.
61. See note 58 supra. Connecticut originally appropriated $6 million to parochial
schools. CONN. GErN. STAT. ANN. §10-281V (1969). A recently passed New York law will
provide $33 million to nonpublic schools for secular educational services and an
Illinois statute makes available to students of private schools a $48 to $60 a year grant
for elementary school pupils and $60 to $90 for high school students. Wall Street J., June
29, 1971, at 22, col. 3. Although there has been a concerted effort by some members of
the Florida Legislature to introduce such legislation, it has thus far failed to pass. See
Fla. S. 391, Fla. H.R. 3585 (1970); Fla. S. 470, Fla. H.R. 836 (Spec. Sess. 1971). Only 8%
of all school children in Florida attend nonpublic schools. There is, however, a strong
Catholic lobby group. Interview with Mr. Kern Alexander, Associate Director, National Educational Finance Project, in Gainesville, Fla., July 14, 1971.
62. See generally TIME, July 10, 1971, at 19; U.S. NEws AND WoRLD R'.,
July 12, 1971,
at 27; Wall Street J., June 29, 1971, at 22, col. 3. One authority has stated that the
American public could smoothly absorb the fiscal impact caused by a large exodus of
parochial students to the public school system. This could be achieved by enactment of
impact laws similar to present federal statutes that provide subsidies to ease the strain on
communities affected by such large government projects. Interview, supra note 61.
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